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ABSTRACT
Information goods can be reconfigured at low cost. There-
fore, firms can choose how to differentiate their products at
a frequency comparable to price changes. However, doing
so effectively is complicated by uncertainty about customer
preferences, compounded by the fact that the search for a
good product niche is carried out in competition with other
searching firms.
We study two firms that differentiate their information
goods. The firms simultaneously compete in product con-
figuration and price. We assume a non-uniform distribution
of consumers: the largest number prefer a product located at
a “sweet spot,” but the rate at which the customer density
falls off away from this product configuration is unknown.
Our characterization reflects the standard tradeoff between
exploitation (current profit) and exploration (learning to en-
hance future profit). In our model firms balance current
profits from competing for a mass and a niche market, while
learning about the profitability of these alternative strate-
gies.
We show that the amount of learning that firms will un-
dertake depends on the convexity or concavity of the profit
function in the rate of demand fall-off. In our model firms
have an incentive to learn, and can use both price and prod-
uct configuration in order to explore. We show that the
ability to explore in product characteristic space leads to a
previously unidentified consequence of learning: attenuation
of competition. The incentive to learn induces firms to dif-
ferentiate their products more than they would if the value
of learning were ignored. This leads to decreased direct com-
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petition with rivals, and thus higher prices and profits than
if the firms were acting myopically. Thus, we might expect
that when firms are not well informed about consumer pref-
erences for information goods — as might be especially true
in new markets for innovative products — product diversity
will be higher and direct competition will be smaller than
might otherwise be expected.
1. INTRODUCTION
Information goods can be reconfigured at low cost. For
example, information aggregators (newspapers, databases)
can unbundle and re-bundle information objects in a vari-
ety of ways. In the print-on-paper world, low-price bundles
(like daily newspapers) generally are offered in one standard
edition (with perhaps a small number of minor variants).
Extensive customization is provided by information services
at a high cost. With electronic publication, the cost of cus-
tomizing a standard edition can approach zero.
There has been little research on how firms choose to dif-
ferentiate their information goods. This problem is espe-
cially challenging because firms rarely have complete infor-
mation about the preferences of potential customers over
product characteristics. Thus, over time they make their
price and product configuration decisions based not only on
expected current profits but also based on the value of the
learning they expect from each period’s offering. To further
complicate things, this search for a good product niche is
carried out in competition with other searching firms.
We consider two firms competing in two dimensions: prod-
uct configuration and price. We model product configura-
tion as a one-dimensional space: a line on which firms choose
a location. In certain markets it is clearly technologically
feasible, and perhaps optimal, for a provider of information
goods to customize its offerings so that it in effect occupies
multiple locations in product space.1 We limit, however, the
firms in our model to choosing one location in any period
for a few reasons. First, we do so in order to focus on the
ability of firms to control the degree of product differenti-
ation in an environment where firms need to learn about
the attractiveness of differentiation. Second, even if firms
could completely customize their offerings based on certain
customer characteristics, it remains quite likely that firms
will attempt to differentiate their offerings from those of
its competitors in other ways. Thus, our model might be
1See, for example, Farag and Van Alstyne [7].
interpreted as one in which firms choose a brand identity.
Generalizing the model to firms that offer multiple product
configurations is a worthwhile task for future research.2
The largest number of customers most prefer a product
located at a “sweet spot”, with the density of customers
preferring other products falling off with distance from the
sweet spot. The firm’s optimal product configuration needs
to balance the rewards from selling to the many customers
near the sweet spot against the dual costs of losing customers
in the less densely populated tails and of lower prices due
to fiercer competition near the sweet spot. This is intended
to suggest the choice between competing for a mass market
and a niche market.3
To introduce uncertainty about consumer preferences we
assume that the firms know the location of the sweet spot,
but not the rate at which demand falls off with distance from
the sweet spot. We use a two-period model to allow the
firms an opportunity to learn about preferences from their
experience. Now we have a problem of exploitation versus
exploration: The locations and prices firms choose each pe-
riod will determine current profits, but (in the first period)
will also reveal information that might increase their ability
to extract profits in future periods. The most informative
location/price combination will not generally yield the high-
est expected current profits. Therefore, the optimal prod-
uct configuration and pricing decision generally balances the
value of learning against the cost of foregone current profits.
Grossman et al. [9] are among the first to study have
identified the exploration versus exploitation tradeoff in an
economic problem.4 As an example, they consider an in-
dividual’s consumption of an item whose value is unknown.
Each time the consumer tries the item, the value she receives
is equal to the underlying value plus a stochastic shock.
Thus the more she experiments with an item, the better
she knows its true value. Under the conditions outlined, the
non-myopic consumer makes larger purchases of this item
in order to learn its value and make better decisions in fu-
ture periods. Subsequent authors, such as McLennan [17]
and Aghion et al. [1] study experimentation by a monopo-
list uncertain about the demand for its product, and derive
conditions under which there will be adequate learning.
In a related paper, Harrington [10] considers duopolists
competing in price in a differentiated products market with
firms uncertain about the degree of substitutability among
products. However, in contrast to our model with endoge-
2Some authors studied firms in Hotelling models that can
sell more than one product, each with a different “location”
or configuration. These authors make the extremely limiting
assumption that price is fixed exogenously, so that compe-
tition is only in location, as well as the other restrictive as-
sumptions of the Hotelling models identified above. Even in
these highly stylized models results are hard to obtain and
are inconsistent. For example, Gabszewicz and Thisse[8]
find that two firms spread their products across the space
but locate each of their varieties right next to the competing
firm’s most similar variety. But Martinez-Giralt and Neven
[16], with only one minor change in assumptions, finds that
firms locate all of their products in a cluster, yet locate those
clusters as far from the competitor’s cluster as possible.
3MacKie-Mason et al. [15] analyze the effect that Internet
service architecture can have on the choice between mass
market and niche product configuration.
4[11] presents an early discussion of exploration versus ex-
ploitation in his formalization of the adaptive learning prob-
lem.
nous product differentiation, Harrington’s firm locations are
fixed. He shows that under certain demand conditions firms
wish to learn in the first period, while under other condi-
tions they do not wish to learn. With price the only strategic
variable in his model, greater learning follows from a greater
price difference between the two firms. In our model, with
firms choosing both price and product configuration, learn-
ing can be increased by lowering price (thereby attracting
more niche customers far from the sweet spot) or by differ-
entiating products. Our model also differs because Harring-
ton’s firms are uncertain about the degree of differentiation
between their products, whereas ours are uncertain about
the distribution of consumer preferences. An implication of
this difference is that, for a given price decrease (holding ev-
erything else constant) a firm in Harrington’s model knows
the number of new customers who enter the market, but not
how many customers the firm takes from its rival. In our
model, neither the number of new customers in the market
nor the number of customers taken from its rival is known
with certainty.
Our model is also related to the Hotelling literature on
endogenous product differentiation.5 The standard model
in that large literature has two firms locating on a line, but
consumer preferences are distributed uniformly on a seg-
ment rather than more densely around a sweet spot. We
work with a richer model of consumer preferences because
the uniform distribution has only one parameter (the width
of the line segment), and to model uncertainty would have
required that we suppose firms did not know how far uniform
consumer preferences over product configurations extended,
which does not readily map to familiar information goods
markets. Our approach allows for uncertainty in a natural
way: firms are not sure how rapidly consumer demand falls
off away from the sweet spot.
The standard Hotelling model also fixes price and lets
firms compete only in location (in contrast to Harrington,
who reverses the state and control variables). We endoge-
nize both price and product configuration. Finally, although
some work on the Hotelling problem incorporates firm un-
certainty, to our knowledge we are the first (other than Har-
rington) to study learning in a location model of endogenous
product differentiation.
Our work is also related to the growing literature, using
both empirical methods and simulations, that studies the
product positioning of information goods. Clay et al. [6]
find that as new firms entered online book selling, prices
remained flat or rose. They document a wide degree of het-
erogeneity product and pricing strategies. They conclude
that ”the real puzzle is the stores with wide selection and
average prices”, but in a new market with substantial learn-
ing, our model suggests that experimenting with this and
various other configurations may not be so puzzling after
all.
Segev and Beam [18] report on some of the practices of
electronic brokerages, who provide prices for other goods or
services, and potential matches to trading partners. They
find tremendous uncertainty about profit maximizing strate-
gies, and that in response experimentation with prices and
product configurations is greater than might be expected.
Through a simulation they find that in this environment
brokers will do best to differentiate widely, for example by
5See Anderson et al. [2] for a thorough survey.
either focusing on serving buyers (charging high fees to sell-
ers and low fees to buyers), or focusing on serving sellers.
In section 2 we present our model, with details on the
information goods market, firm behavior and consumer be-
havior. We then solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium
of the two-stage game in section 3. We discuss the results
and possible generalizations in section 4. Our primary result
is that firms will use first-period price and product configu-
ration in order to increase learning. However, in contrast to
standard models of firm learning, this is not at the expense
of first-period profits. Firms are able to increase learning
by increasing the level of differentiation between their prod-
ucts. This reduction of competition enables firms to increase




We consider a market for an information good that can be
differentiated in one dimension. An example would be Web
sites that provide news content, differentiated by the ratio of
national to international news. A more general model would
permit differentiation in multiple dimensions. We represent
this dimension as a line on the real numbers. The product
offered by each firm is characterized as a location on this
line.
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Figure 1: Distribution of consumers’ most preferred
product configurations over range of product possi-
bilities
We characterize a consumer by the product configuration
(location) she most prefers. We then map the distribution
of consumers over the product space line, with the vertical
height above the line representing the number of consumers
for whom that location represents their most preferred prod-
uct configuration (see figure 1). We assume that there is a
single product configuration that is most preferred by the
largest number of consumers. We call the location of these
α consumers the “sweet spot”, normalized to be the zero
on the horizontal axis. Along the product space axis, the
distance from the most popular location is represented by
l, which can be either positive or negative. The number of
consumers decreases as one moves away from the sweet spot
at a rate of γ. Thus the number of consumers located at l
is α− γ|l|.
2.2 Consumer Behavior
We assume consumers purchase at most one of the two
competing goods in each period. There is no cost to eval-
uating the options and choosing a provider. A consumer
receives a utility of r if she consumes her most preferred
good, and an amount that decreases at rate c the further
the consumed good is from her most preferred configuration.
Letting (l, p) represent a product’s configuration and price,
a consumer of type t receives r − p− c ∗ |t− l|. Consumers
select the good that provides the greater utility, or neither if
utility would be negative. That some consumers may choose
to purchase nothing is another factor that distinguishes our
model from the standard Hotelling approach, which assumes
that all consumers purchase. In our model there is both an
intensive and extensive margin: A firm can lose (niche) cus-
tomers to the “outside option” or (mass market) customers
to “head-to-head” competition with the other firm.
We assume that the distance cost is linear for analytic
convenience. The constant cost c could be interpreted as
the loss in utility per article as a bundled information good
offers fewer articles of the type the consumer wishes to read
(e.g., less national news). In a more general representation
of preferences the distance cost might be nonlinear.
The density of consumers who purchase a given firm’s
good according to the behavioral rule above constitute that
firm’s demand. For two reasons we add a stochastic com-
ponent to each firm’s demand. First, it is unreasonable to
model a world with firm uncertainty but to then assume that
every consumer makes exactly the right decision every pe-
riod. The second reason we provide below, after we explain
the information available to the firm and its behavior. To
implement stochastic demand we assume that each firm i’s
demand is subject to an additive random variable, εi, whose
cdf Gi() has a mean of zero and variance of σε.
2.3 Firm Behavior
Two firms compete in this market for two periods. The
firms are ex ante identical. In each period, at zero cost, each
firm can differentiate its product by choosing a location on
the line, at the same time announcing a price. The firm’s ob-
jective is to maximize the sum of discounted profits, which
are equal to revenues because we assume that location and
production costs are zero to capture the easy reconfigurabil-
ity and reproduction of information goods.
We assume the values α, c, r, and the distributions of the
εi and of γ are known to both firms. The need for learning
arises because they do not know the value of γ. However,
the firms have the same distribution of prior beliefs over
γ, denoted by the CDF F (γ), and thus the same expected
valuation (µ̂0).
After the first period of trade, the prices, locations and
number of consumers served by each firm is common knowl-
edge. Conditional on this knowledge and the prior belief µ̂0,
firms update their beliefs about the value of γ. Our primary
goal is to investigate how the opportunity to learn about the
value of γ affects the conduct of the firm in the first period.
Above we gave one reason why we assume each firm’s de-
mand has an additive stochastic component, εi. The second
reason is that given the common knowledge assumed above,
almost any location and price in the first period would re-
veal the true value of γ to each firm. The intuition is that
the density function is piecewise linear with each slope hav-
ing the same absolute magnitude, and firms already know
one point on the function (α). If they could observe demand
from this density perfectly then they could solve for a second
point on the density function and could perfectly calculate
the slopes. In no realistic problem can firms perfectly infer
all relevant consumer preference information from a single
experiment, so we add a noise term to ensure incomplete
inference.
3. SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
In this section we solve the model for a subgame perfect
equilibrium. Our two-period subgame perfect framework
does enable us to draw valuable inferences about the more
realistic case where the number of periods is larger. First,
we use second period behavior as a “no learning” or myopic
benchmark against which to compare the actions of firms
who take into account the consequences of current period
actions on subsequent period profits. Second, adding addi-
tional periods does little alter the incentives of the game.
We can thus view the first period as representing periods
under which the firms act under uncertainty and the final
period as the limiting case as the value to learning goes to
zero.
We believe there is substantial value to the study of the
equilibria of a tractable but reasonably realistic model of the
dynamics of learning and product configuration. First, by
knowing the equilibria of the game, we will know something
about the behavioral incentives facing firms that find them-
selves out of equilibrium in a more realistic setting. Second,
we are able to obtain explicit analytic results, which en-
ables us to establish general predictions about the compar-
ison firms that strategically learn and those that do not. In
future research these predictions can then be tested against
empirical data. Further, the predictions of the game-theoretic
equilibria can be used as a guide to the design of intelligent
heuristics; we discuss this possibility in relation to our own
research on software agent heuristics in section 4.
Since the game is finite, we use backward recursion: We
first solve for optimal play by the two firms in the second
period, conditional on their updated expectation, µ̂1, from
the first period. In the subgame we look for Nash equilib-
ria, in which if each firm makes the best play conditional on
the choices of the other firm, the choices will be mutually
consistent. Then, given the solutions for prices and loca-
tions in the second period as a function of µ̂1, we solve for
the optimal price and location choices by the firms in the
first period. Since their objective is to maximize the sum
of discounted profits over the two periods, their first period
choices will take into account not only profits in the first
period, but also the effect of these first period actions on
expected second period profits due to their learning about
the slope of the customer preference density.
We denote the leftmost firm as firm 1, and the rightmost
as firm 2, and their locations as l1 and l2 respectively. Given
the consumer choice rule, for any l1 and l2 we can identify
the leftmost and rightmost consumer types who purchase
one of the goods as follows:








The consumer type which is indifferent between the offer-
















Market for firm 1 Market for firm 2 
Figure 2: Illustration of market division between
firms
Proposition 1. In a pure strategy equilibrium, all cus-
tomers located between the two firms are served. Thus there
exists a unique tm.
(Proofs for the results are given in an appendix.)
Without loss of generality, assume that tm ≥ 0. Then
demand for each firm is
D1 (p1, p2, l1, l2) =
0∫
tl
(α + γl) dl +
tm∫
0
(α− γl) dl + ε1, (1)
D2 (p1, p2, l1, l2) =
tr∫
tm
(α− γl) dl + ε2. (2)
Profits for each firm are:
π1 (p1, p2, l1, l2) = p1D (p1, p2, l1, l2)
π2 (p1, p2, l1, l2) = p2D (p1, p2, l1, l2) .
3.1 Second Period Equilibrium
Given µ̂1, their expectation of γ after period 1, firms max-
imize total expected profit.6 Taking the other firm’s price
and location as given, each firm calculates the first order
conditions for its profit function subject to two constraints.
6The profit functions are linear in γ, so we can replace γ by
its expected value µ̂ when calculating expected profits.
The first is that all consumers who purchase receive non-
negative utility The second is that l2 ≥ l1. We assume for
the moment that neither constraint binds. This yields four
best response functions in four unknowns:
l1(p1; p2, l2) = 0
p1(l1; p2, l2) = 0
l2(p2; p1, l1) = 0
p2(l2; p1, l1) = 0.
which are then solved to find the Nash equilibrium.7 Only
one of the sixteen solutions to this system satisfies the second-
order conditions, so in the unique equilibrium firms set price





















which will yield the following expected profit














We can provide some economic interpretation to the best
response functions and the resulting equilibrium. If we look
solely at the location decision of firm 1, setting marginal ben-
efit equal to marginal cost implies that for an incremental
move closer to its opponent, the number of customers that
firm 1 gains from its rival equals the number lost on the out-
side margin. By differentiating the bounds of integration of
the demand function with respect to location, we see that
the former is equal to 1
2
the height at tm and the latter is
equal to the height at tr or tl. The best response in terms of
price alone is more complicated, but still involves balancing
the internal and external margins. For our symmetric equili-
brium where the middle indifferent consumer is at the sweet
spot, there are a continuum of price and location pairs that
satisfy the condition that the external and internal margins
must be equal. Whether the firms locate near the middle
at a relatively low price or closer to the midpoint of 0 and
tr (or tl) at a relatively high prices depends on how much
firms desire to fight for the mass market. The desirability of
the mass market in turn depends on the expected slope of
consumer density, µ̂: the lower is µ̂, the more valuable are
the niche markets relative to the (more competitive) mass
market. This can be seen from the effect of µ̂ on equilibrium
prices and locations in equations (3)-(6).
We next examine at how expected profit depends on µ̂:
7The best response functions are extremely long so we do not
reproduce them here. They are available from the authors
upon request.
∂E [πi|µ̂] /∂µ̂ = −9cα
3
32µ̂3
< 0 ∀µ̂ > 0 (7)
∂2E [πi|µ̂] /∂µ̂2 = 27cα
3
32µ̂4
> 0 ∀µ̂ > 0. (8)
Expected profits are decreasing in µ̂. This is due to the
fact that, when we increase γ, demand falls off more sharply
as we move away from the sweet spot. Equation (8) implies
that expected profits are convex in µ̂. That expected profits
are convex in µ̂ implies the firms behave as if risk-loving,
i.e., they prefer more variability in their posterior mean on
γ. That is, they prefer to learn more information about
the actual value of γ, as this permits them to do a better
job optimizing in period 2. We discuss this point in further
detail in Section 4.
At this point, we must return to the neglected constraints,
which force us to put bounds on the range of beliefs for
which the above equilibrium holds. As shown in Proposition
1, in any pure-strategy equilibrium there are no unserved
consumers between the two firms. This will only be true in
a symmetric equilibrium if a consumer located at the sweet
spot has non-negative utility. From the consumer utility
function and the equilibrium prices in (3)-(4) this will be
true in our equilibrium only if µ̂ ≥ 5αc
8r
. Likewise, to ensure
that l2 ≥ l1, it is necessary that µ̂ ≤ 7αc8r .8 The above






can show that for values of µ̂ outside of this range, the unique
equilibrium will be asymmetric.
The “reasonable” width of this range for µ̂ is an empiri-
cal question, since there are no constraints other than non-
negativity on the free parameters. The important question
is whether this region captures an economically interesting
set of problems. We believe that it does. This region is
important because it is precisely the region in which firms
desire to compete both for the mass market and remain at-
tractive to many in the niche market. This is an accurate
description for many markets of interest.
Outside of this range for µ̂ the model corresponds to dif-
ferent types of markets. For example, consider the effect of
decreasing µ̂ inside the symmetric range: the niche markets
become more attractive. As one would expect, our equi-
librium conditions show that the firms are less inclined to
compete for the mass market: the firms increase product
differentiation and prices increase as firms act more like lo-
cal monopolists in the niches. As we continue to decrease µ̂
past the symmetric range, an interesting thing happens. We
can show that if one firm is serving the sweet spot, the best
response of the other firm is to not compete at all for con-
sumers served by the former. In short, the niche becomes
so attractive that it is preferable to be a local monopolist
for this niche. In this situation there is no head-to-head
competition for the mass market, and thus the firms do not
balance their appeal to mass market and niche customers.
8That l2 ≥ l1 is arbitrary, but we used it to specify the
demand functions facing each firm in our solution for the
equilibrium. The same parameter restriction would hold if
we reversed the firms and imposed l1 ≥ l2. More gener-
ally, what is required is that firms compute their expected
demand consistently with their equilibrium location.
9In order to ensure that µ̂ is in this range in the second
period, it suffices that the firms place zero probability on
any γ outside of this range in the first period.
Whether we are in this case, the case where µ̂ is so steep as
to make the niches unattractive, or the intermediate case in
which firms balance between selling to both mass and niche
markets of course depends on the market in question. In this
paper, we limit our attention to the case where µ̂ is inside
the specified range, and leave an analysis of the dynamics of
the other two cases to future work.
3.2 First Period Equilibrium
Having solved for the equilibrium in the last period, we
now characterize the Nash solution for the first period, tak-
ing into account the effect of first period choices on expected
second period prices, locations and profits. The link between
periods is through learning: realized first period demand
provides information about the value of γ, so that generi-
cally µ̂1 = µ̂0, and second period prices and locations are
functions of µ̂1 (see equations (3)-(6)).
Firms update their beliefs on γ based on the implica-
tion of their locations and the total realized demand for
the preference density slope, taking into account that de-
mand has a mean zero stochastic component. Making use
of the symmetry of the demand density and that firms locate
equidistant from the sweet spot, we derive the following to-
tal demand equation for D(p1, p2, l1, l2) ≡ D1(p1, p2, l1, l2)+
D2(p1, p2, l1, l2):
D(p1, p2, l1, l2) = 2
tr∫
0
(α− γl) dl + ε (9)




























Proposition 2. The left-hand side of (10) is an unbiased






After observing first period total demand, firms apply
Bayes’ rule to combine their prior beliefs with this new un-
biased estimate to obtain updated beliefs on γ.
We can view the choice of prices and locations followed by
a demand observation as an experiment. An experiment is
more informative if it reduces the variance of the estimator.
As the denominator of the variance is equal to t4r = t
4
l , reduc-
ing the variance is accomplished by increasing the number
of niche consumers served. The intuition is that as the firms
increase their reach (i.e., by moving tl and tr further away
from the sweet spot), demand is more affected by γ, and the
relative effect of ε diminishes. Firms increase their reach by
either lowering their prices or moving away from the sweet
spot.10
10That the distribution of ε is independent of total demand is
an analytic convenience. Increasing reach will assuredly pro-
vide a more informative experiment if the ratio of variance
of ε to total demand is non-increasing as tr = −tl increases.
We define the posterior cdf of γ as F (·|D(p1, p2, l1, l2)).11
We apply Bayes’ Rule to get:
F ′(γ|D(p1, p2, l1, l2)) = G








D − 2αtr + γt2r
)
F ′(γ)dγ.
Because both firms have access to the same information
about the outcome of the first-period experiment, they ar-
rive at the same updated distribution of beliefs about γ and
thus the same and expected value, µ̂1. We have shown pre-
viously that with the same bounded beliefs about γ, the
unique second-period equilibrium is symmetric. Therefore,
for any first-period equilibrium the two firms have the same
expected second-period profit equal to






F ′(γ|D(p1, p2, l1, l2) dγ
]
H ′(D) dD.
Both firms maximize cumulative profits discounted at rate
δ, so the first-period value function for firm 2 is






+δW (p1, p2, l1, l2) if tm ≥ 0
0∫
tm




+δW (p1, p2, l1, l2) if tm ≤ 0.
A firm’s best reply function, φi, is a pair of price-location
values defined by
φi (pj , lj) ∈ arg max
pi,li
Vi (pi, li; pj , lj) .
Proposition 3. φi exists.
A symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium exists iff there
exists l̂1 = −l̂2 and p̂1 = p̂2 such that








Proposition 4. A symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium
exists.
We now establish our main result. We wish to establish
the effect that the opportunity to learn has on first-period
price and product differentiation decisions. To do this, we
compare the equilibrium first-period prices and locations to
those that would be an equilibrium if both firms ignored the
value of learning.
Since both prices and locations can be changed costlessly
between periods, without learning there is no link between
the periods, and optimal first-period behavior is purely ex-
ploitative: that is, the maximizing the sum of discounted
two-period profits degenerates into separately maximizing
11To reduce clutter we do not label variables with a period in-
dex. In this section prices and locations refer to first period
activity.
profits in each period based on the prior expectation µ̂0
on the unknown slope γ. Consequently, the best response
functions in the first period are the same as in the second
period. Denoting first-period equilibrium price and location
values for a firm that ignores learning by {p̆i, l̆i}, these values
are the same as the second-period values: {p̆1, l̆1, p̆2, l̆2} =
{p∗1(µ̂0), l∗1(µ̂0), p∗2(µ̂0), l∗2(µ̂0)}. Therefore, from the results
of section 3.1 we know that a unique and symmetric first-
period equilibrium exists for these non-learning firms.
Proposition 5. A firm that takes the value of learning
into account in the first period will choose a location further
from the sweet spot, and a price higher than would a firm
that ignores the value of learning. That is, for i = 1, 2,
p̂i > p̆i
|l̂i| > |l̆i|.
The consequence is that consumers will face more product
diversity, but higher prices, in an information goods market
described by our assumptions.
3.3 Consumer Welfare
We analyze the effect of the learning process on consumers
for two reasons. First, while the process results in a short
run increase in market power for the firm, it also results
in an increase in product diversity and in the number of
consumers served, so that aggregate consumer welfare may
actually increase. Second, understanding the effect on con-
sumer welfare sheds light on the manner in which firms con-
duct their learning. We find that even within the range of
beliefs about γ where the symmetric equilibrium holds, their
beliefs about the attractiveness of the niche will determine
how much competition is relaxed for a given experiment.
The effect of the learning process on consumer welfare is a
complicated affair. Looking solely at the first period effect,
how an individual consumer fares will depend on her type.
Those located near the sweet spot will face higher prices
and products less tailored to their tastes when firms locate
further apart but raise their prices. Consumers located to
the outside of the firm locations will receive a more desir-
able product, albeit at an increased price. Finally, as the
number of consumers served increases in a learning environ-
ment, these new consumers clearly benefit. In this section,
we look to resolve some of this ambiguity.
Using notation developed in Section 3.2, we define the
no-learning equilibrium prices and locations as p̆i and l̆i.
Making use of the symmetry of equilibrium demands, we
look solely at the expected surplus of consumers to the right





(α− µ̂l)(r − c|l̆2 − l| − p2)dl. (11)
We now look at how consumer surplus changes as firms
increase their reach. As we show in section 5 at equations
(17)-(19), for any given reach, t̃ = tr = −tl, we can write
the profit maximizing prices and locations as follows:










Armed with a characterization of the equilibrium prices
and locations as firms increase their reach, we can now gauge
their effects on consumers. In equation (11), we change the
outer bound of integration to t̃, and substitute for prices and
locations as detailed in equations (12) and (13). Differenti-













There is thus a region where consumer surplus is increas-
ing in expectation, and one in which it is decreasing. We








where consumer surplus is increasing in expectation for µ̂ >







We can gain some insight towards interpreting this con-
dition by looking at how a firm changes price as it changes
its reach. In Section 5, we show that ∂p̃2/∂t̃ = c
(
1 − t̃µ̂/α).
Thus the greater µ̂, the smaller any price increase for a
given “unit” of learning (i.e. change in reach). Likewise,
the greater µ̂, the less firms move their locations towards
the tails. We can thus see how the manner in which firms
experiment is affected by their beliefs. Even though firms
desire to explore the niches, if their beliefs about the at-
tractiveness of the tail are “pessimistic” enough, the mass
market is more worth fighting over, and this moderates their
move towards the niche for the sake of learning.
Thus, for low µ̂ (more valuable niches) firm learning re-
duces consumer welfare, while for higher µ̂ (more competi-
tion for the mass market) learning increases consumer wel-
fare.
4. DISCUSSION
Rather than charge prices or differentiate goods to max-
imize current expected profits, firms may choose different
prices or product configurations in order to create better
experiments to improve their estimates of consumer prefer-
ences. Experimentation is usually thought to be undertaken
at the expense of short-run profits. We have shown that this
need not be the case. In a model of competition under un-
certainty, in which firms have the ability to decrease direct
competition, firms’ desire to resolve uncertainty can lead to
to short-run profits higher than would be the case if firms
did not care about subsequent periods.
In our model of endogenous product differentiation with
uncertainty about consumer preferences, firms are trying to
learn the rate at which consumer preferences fall off away
from the “sweet spot”, in order to choose the right balance
between competing with low prices for the mass market of
consumer and competing with higher prices for a niche mar-
ket. What firms learn in the first period about the distri-
bution of consumer preferences changes their second-period
price and product configuration choices. Thus, first-period
price and configuration choices affect expected second-period
profits.
The amount of learning that a firm desires to undertake
(at the cost of foregone current profits) depends on the con-
vexity or concavity of the profit function in the firm’s be-
lief about the unknown parameter, µ̂. Due to Jensen’s In-
equality, a concave utility function induces risk aversion:
the decision-maker prefers a given value with certainty to a
gamble with the same expected payoff.
In our model of endogenously-differentiated information
goods future profits are convex in beliefs about γ. Con-
sequently, firms prefer a gamble to that gamble’s expected
payoff, and they are willing to alter first period actions to
gamble on what they will learn about γ. In order to learn
more about γ, firms set first-period prices and product con-
figurations to better explore the tails of consumer space than
they would if they ignored the opportunity to learn.
This “risk loving” behavior arises even though the firms
are by assumption risk neutral. For given prices and loca-
tions, profits are linear in γ, and firms thus maximize profits
based on the expected value of γ. Only when the true state
of the world is µ̂, however, are the firms actually choosing
the optimal actions for that state. The effect of γ on profits
is not linear because if the firms “knew” that the state of the
world was not µ̂, they would choose better actions. Firms
thus desire better information about what γ actually is, i.e.
have a desire to experiment, so that they can better tailor
their actions to the actual state of the world.
The manner in which a firm’s desire to experiment affects
prices and product configurations is relatively straightfor-
ward. As a firm’s “reach” increases its sales are more af-
fected by the value of γ, and the stochastic component of
demand becomes relatively less important. Thus, locating
further away provides a more informative experiment.
While it is true that firms could decrease price to increase
demand and thus increase the informativeness of the exper-
iment, we actually see the opposite effect on prices in this
model. To understand why, consider a given experiment,
which is to say an expansion of the outer bounds of con-
sumers who buy (tl and tr). While a firm could serve this
customer base by lowering its price, it could also move fur-
ther away from its direct competition, which allows it to
raise price. Clearly the latter strategy is superior, as it al-
lows the firm to serve the same number of customers at a
higher price.
Our main result suggests that when there is uncertainty
about consumer preferences for information goods, there will
be substantial experimentation in the form of product di-
versity. This seems consistent with casual observation of
the past several years of commerce in information and other
electronically transacted goods. With many new goods and
services uncertainty about preferences has been high. Cor-
respondingly the rate of introduction of new products and
differentiation amongst them has been quite high.
Whether prices have been high or low for new products is
not as obvious. In some markets the desirability of charging
higher prices has perhaps been mitigated by other factors,
such as the desire to build a brand reputation or to lock
in customers. However, evidence from Bailey [3] suggests
that as new firms entered in various electronic commerce
markets, prices increased.
Whether our results are robust requires further investiga-
tion. For example, we are currently analyzing the dynamics
that arise in the asymmetric equilibria that arise when γ is
lower than the range studied in this paper (when niches are
expected to be either more or less desirable). There are other
directions in which one could generalize our model. For ex-
ample, firms might be heterogeneous in one of several ways:
they might start with different beliefs, or they might start at
different locations in product space and have nonzero costs
of re-location. We also might learn more from a model in
which there are multiple dimensions along which products
can be differentiated, or in which there are more than two
firms that sell imperfectly substitutable information goods
(or in which each firm can sell multiple different goods). We
also wonder whether the effect of valuable learning oppor-
tunities on pricing and product differentiation would be the
same if there were more than one unknown parameter of
the consumer preferences distribution. For example, a firm
might not know the slope γ and also might not know the
disutility cost c consumers incur as offered product configu-
rations get further away from their most preferred product.
In a series of papers ([12, 4, 14, 13, 5] we and our co-
authors have studied the out-of-equilibrium behavior of soft-
ware agents that search price and product configuration
spaces under uncertainty about consumer preferences. In
those papers the agents representing firms selling informa-
tion goods face environments too complex to explicitly solve
for optimal strategies even in a single firm environment. In-
stead, they pursue various search heuristics. We adopted
relatively generic (uninformed) search heuristics due to the
relative paucity of prior literature on the theory of optimal
product and price configuration in an information goods en-
vironment. The results in the present paper, by character-
izing some of the properties of optimal learning strategies
in a particular setting, provide guidance for the design of
informed search strategies in more complex (and thus re-
alistic) settings. In separate research, we are pursuing the
implications of the present paper for computational analyses
of behavior off the equilibrium path.
5. APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Proof. 1 Assume that this is not the case in the second
period. Then there are unserved consumers located between
the two firms. Without loss of generality assume that some
of these consumers are of type t > 0. Due to the fact that
consumer density decreases as we increase t, the number of
consumers at the right boundary of the leftmost firm (α −
µ̂(l2− r−p2c )) is greater than the number of consumers at the
leftmost boundary of the rightmost firm (α− µ̂(l2 + r−p2c ))
for all γ. Therefore the rightmost firm can profitably deviate
by moving its location to the left, so this cannot be a pure
strategy equilibrium. The same logic holds if some of these
consumers are of type t < 0.
The proof is similar for period 1. In addition to the in-
crease in profits in period 1, the deviation also increases
expected profits in period 2. To see this, note that from
Proposition 2 the deviation decreases that variance of the
estimator. As expected second period profits are convex
in the expectation of γ, a more informative experiment in-
creases expected profits.
Proof. 2 The result is transparent: the variance of the
estimator is the variance of ε divided by a constant, which
is σ2ε divided by the squared constant.
Proof. 3 From equations (1) and (2) we have that ag-
gregate demand is continuous in {p1, p2, l1, l2}, and thus
that the value function is continuous in the same arguments.
Since pi ∈ [0, r] and |li| ∈ [0, αγ ], φi exists by the Weierstrass
Theorem.
Proof. 4
We first prove that if an equilibrium exists it is symmet-
ric. Note that the expected second-period profit function
δW (p1, p2, l1, l2) is the same in the value function for both
firms, and symmetric because second-period profits are sym-
metric. Other than this additive expression, the first-period
value functions are identical to the second period expected
profit functions. Thus, a firm’s first-order conditions are
identical in the two periods except for the addition of a par-
tial derivative of δW with respect to the choice variable of
interest; that partial derivative will be symmetric for the
two firms because the function W is symmetric. Therefore,
if a solution to the system of first-order conditions exists, a
symmetric solution must exist.
We now show the existence of the equilibrium. We first
note that firms affect expected second period profits, W (·),
solely through their choice of tr and tl. As any prices and
locations yielding the same tl and tr are equally informative,
prices and locations will be such that they maximize current
profits for a selected tr and tl. For any t̃ = tr = −tl, there
exists a unique price and location pair (p̃i, l̃1 = −l̃2) that
maximizes current period profits. These values are given
by12:





















We can thus characterize maximal one-period expected prof-
its for any t̃ as follows:
E[πi|t̃, µ̂] = ct̃
2(µ̂t̃− 2α)2
4α
The firms’ maximization problem thus reduces to finding
t̂ to maximize total discounted expected profits. A firm’s





and symmetric equilibrium is t̂ ∈ arg maxt̃ V (t̃). Existence
of t̂ follows the same reasoning as presented in preceding
proof.
Proof. 5
Define t̆ as the “reach” that maximizes expected first pe-
riod profits, i.e. t̆ = l̆2 +
r−p̆2
c
, and t̂ as t̃ ∈ arg maxt̃ V (t̃).
The informativeness of first period prices and locations are
increasing in t̃. Thus, due to the convexity of E[π|µ̂] in µ̂,
W (·) is increasing in t̃. This combined with the fact that




myopic profits) for all t < t̆ implies that t̂ ≥ t̆.
To see the direction in which prices and locations move as
we increase t̃, we differentiate equations (17) and (19) with
respect to t̃ and get
12Simple algebraic substitution reveals that the solution to
the one-period maximation problem given by equations (3)-









> 0 ∀t̃ < α
µ̂
(20)
∂l̃2/∂t̃ = 2 − t̃µ̂
α
> 0 ∀t̃ < α
µ̂
. (21)
Thus, p̂i ≥ p̆i and |l̂i| ≥ |l̆i|.
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